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Abstract
Chisholm’s paradox serves as an important constraint on our modal theorising. For
example, one lesson of the paradox is that widely accepted essentialist theses appear
incompatible with metaphysical necessity obeying a logic that includes S4. However,
this article cautions against treating Chisholm’s paradox in isolation, as a single line of
reasoning.To this end, the article outlines two crucialmorals aboutChisholm’s paradox
which situate the paradox within a broad family of paradoxes. Each moral places
significant constraints on the paradox’s solution space. In light of this perspective, the
paper applies the two morals to a recently proposed solution to Chisholm’s Paradox
by Benj Hellie, Murray andWilson (in: Bennett and Zimmerman (eds) Oxford studies
in metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
Keywords Metaphysical modality · Chisholm’s Paradox · Modal logic · Relativised
metaphysical modality
Chisholm’s Paradox serves as an important constraint on our modal theorising. 1 In
response to the paradox, Nathan Salmon (1986, 1989) has proposed that S4 is not a
lower bound on the logic of metaphysical necessity. Others, such as Chisholm (1967)
himself, have adopted an extremely stringent form of essentialism. More recently,
Benj Hellie, AdamMurray, and JessicaWilson (2012; forthcoming) have developed an
interesting viewof relativised metaphysical necessity according towhichmetaphysical
necessity exhibits a distinctive type of relativity.
The purpose of this article is to emphasise, bolster, and apply two important morals
about Chisholm’s Paradox. Each moral places significant constraints on the paradox’s
solution space. The moral of equivalence is that in certain systems of modal logic
Chisholm’s Paradox is a mere logical variant of a paradox involving no iterated neces-
sity claims. This moral was first noticed by Graeme Forbes (1984, pp. 172–173);
1 Thanks are due to Annina Loets, Peter Fritz, James Studd, Timothy Williamson, and two referees for this
journal for helpful feedback and comments.
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however, the current article clarifies it significantly and bolsters the moral in crucial
respects. In light of that discussion, the article argues that themoral of equivalence cre-
ates significant awkwardness forHellie,Murray, andWilson’s treatment of Chisholm’s
paradox in terms of relativised metaphysical necessity. Supplementing this, the moral
of revenge is that some proposed solutions to Chisholm’s Paradox are susceptible to
revenge versions of the paradox. Following Andrew Bacon’s (2018, chap. 15) recent
discussion of an essentialist paradox, the article develops a revenge paradox for Hellie,
Murray, andWilson’s proposed solution in terms of relativisedmetaphysical necessity.
Although each moral will be applied to this proposed solution, it will be clear that
they embody more general lessons.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 1 introduces Chisholm’s Paradox
in its canonical form, as developed by Hugh Chandler (1976) and Nathan Salmon
(1986; 1989), and charts the surrounding logical geography. In doing so, the article
draws and bolsters the moral of equivalence. With an eye to applying each moral,
Sect. 2 outlinesHellie,Murray, andWilson’s proposed solution in detail. Subsequently,
the article outlines how the moral of equivalence creates significant awkwardness
for their solution. Section 3 then turns to developing the moral of revenge. Since
revenge paradoxes must be developed in the context of a proposed solution, the article
constructs a revenge paradox in the context of Hellie, Murray, and Wilson’s proposal.
Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
1 A family of paradoxes?
Essence is not an utterly liberal notion: typically it is assumed that an object’s modal
profile does not permit total variation in how that object may be.2 For example, one
notable essentialist constraint is the idea that no material object could have originated
from material totally different to that from which it actually does. As Kripke (1980,
p. 113; final emphasis mine) wrote in his now influential discussion:
How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different
sperm and egg, be this very woman? One can imagine, given the woman [Queen
Elizabeth II], that various things in her life could have changed: that she should
have become a pauper; that her royal blood should have been unknown, and so
on. [...] This seems to be possible. And so it’s possible that even though she were
born of these parents she never became queen. Even though she were born of
these parents, like Mark Twain’s character [in The Prince and The Pauper] she
was switched off with another girl. But what is harder to imagine is her being
born of different parents. It seems to me that anything coming from a different
origin would not be this object.
Let us call this idea Kripke’s Thesis:
2 As a simplification, we shall regiment essentialist claims as de re metaphysical necessities. Since even
proponents of non-modal conceptions of essence such as Fine (1994) take essence to imply de re necessity,
this simplification is harmless for current purposes.
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Kripke’s Thesis Material objects cannot originate from matter totally different
to that from which they do.
There appears to be reasonable textual evidence for attributing Kripke the view that no
material object can originate from matter totally different to that from which it does;
see in particular Kripke (1980, p. 114, n. 56). For this reason,Kripke’s Thesis should
be understood in terms of a universal restricted quantifier over material objects (as
should Tolerance below).
Although Kripke’s Thesis serves as one constraint on material objects’ modal
profiles, ordinaryobjects are not utterly intolerant tomodal variation. Indeed, asNathan
Salmon (1986, 1989) famously noted, essence is reasonably tolerant. For example,
although Queen Elizabeth II could not have had a totally different origin, surely she
could have originated from a sperm with a difference of only one mitochondrion to
the one from which she actually originated. As Salmon (1989, p. 5; his emphasis)
describes a similar, now also famous case:
[A] particularmaterial artifact—say, a particularwooden tablewhichwemaycall
‘Woody’—could have originated from matter slightly different from its actual
original matter m∗ (while retaining its numerical identity, or its haecceity) but
not from entirely different matter.
To be explicit again, let us call this thesis Tolerance:
Tolerance Material objects can originate from matter slightly different to that
from which they do.
Note that Tolerance is not itself to be read as implicitly necessitated, although its
explicit necessitation will be considered at various points in what follows.
Hugh Chandler (1976) and Nathan Salmon (1986, 1989) both credit Roderick
Chisholm (1967) with the observation that under natural assumptionsKripke’s Thesis
and Tolerance together lead to paradox.3 Following Salmon’s (1986, 1989) presenta-
tion, the argument leads with the idea that Tolerance is no contingent accident, and
that it is a matter of necessity that material objects can originate from matter slightly
different to that from which they do. An informal version of the argument, which
eventually will be regimented much more carefully, is then often presented as follows.
Let ‘Woody’ refer to some actualwooden tablewhich originates fromsix, equally
sized and shaped pieces of matter, mm6. (Here, ‘mm6’ is a plural name.) For
simplicity, assume that it necessary, and necessarily necessary ... that Woody
originates from six parts. Now consider mm5, the actual pieces of matter just
like mm6 except whereas mm6 include m1, mm5 include n1—an object distinct
frombut qualitatively similar tom1. ByTolerance,Woody could have originated
from mm5. However, by the necessitation of Tolerance, Woody then could have
originated from mm4, the pieces of matter just like mm5 except whereas mm5
include m2, mm4 include n2—an object distinct from but qualitatively similar
3 To be clear, Chisholm’s original article focuses on a version of the paradox which does not invoke the
necessity of origin: the article was published three years before Kripke’s Naming and Necessity lectures
were delivered at Princeton.
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to m2. Yet iterating this reasoning leads to the claim that had Woody originated
from mm1, then it could have originated from matter completely different from
that which it actually does, in apparent violation of Kripke’s Thesis.
An immediate observation is that the behaviour of iterated modalities in the argument
requires articulating with greater care. In order to do so, it will help to introduce some
formal resources in the form of a simple modal propositional logic.
The official regimentation will proceed in a simple modal propositional language
L, which consists of countablymany proposition letters (p0, p1, . . .),¬ (negation) and
→ (the material conditional) as the only truth-functional connectives, and  (meta-
physical necessity), with ♦ and the other connectives introduced metalinguistically
as usual. Informally, think of ‘p6’ as the sentence ‘Woody originates from six parts,
m1,…,m6’, ‘p5’ as the sentence ‘Woody originates from six parts, m1,…,m5, n6’,
‘p4’ as the sentence ‘Woody originates from six parts, m1,…,m4, n5, n6’, and so on.
Under this informal understanding, the sentence ¬♦p0 formalises a relevant instance
of Kripke’s Thesis for Woody and the sentence p6 → ♦p5 formalises the instance of
Tolerance concerning Woody. Similarly, sentences of the form (pi → ♦pi−1) (for
1 ≤ i ≤ 6) may be understood as formalising instances of the necessitated version of
Tolerance concerning Woody. Working in L, one version of Salmon’s argument then
runs as follows:
(1) p6
(2) p6 → ♦p5




(7) (p1 → ♦p0)
(8) ♦p0
Premise (1) is the assumption thatWoody originates from the sixmm6. Again, premise
(2) is the relevant instance of Tolerance concerning Woody, and premises (3)–(7)
may be understood as formalising instances of the necessitated version of Tolerance
concerning Woody. Yet (8) contradicts the claim that it is not possible for Woody to
originate from material totally different to that from which it actually does (¬♦p0),
the formalisation of the relevant instance of Kripke’s Thesis. Following the extant
practice, let us call this argument Chisholm’s Paradox.
Chisholm’s Paradox is valid in any normal system of modal logic that containsK4
in the sense that it has all instances of the following schemas as theorems:
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K (φ → ψ) → φ → ψ
4 ♦♦φ → ♦φ
The K and 4 schemas are used to prove that ♦pi−1 is implied by (pi → ♦pi−1)
and ♦pi , for in K one can derive all instances of the following schema:
K♦ (φ → ψ) → ♦φ → ♦ψ
Yet with K♦ one can show that (pi → ♦pi−1) implies ♦pi → ♦♦pi−1. So given
that ♦pi , it follows that ♦♦pi−1. Thus from 4, one may conclude ♦pi−1.
Another essentialist paradox, however, can be extracted from the above Woody
case which does not require any instance of the 4 schema.4 This paradox takes the
form of a straightforward modal sorites. It begins with the idea of Tolerance, that
Woody could have originated from matter mm5 slightly different to that from which it
actually does (mm6). But, the soritical thought goes, if mmi is slightly different from
mm6, so is mmi−1. Thus, the argument runs, if Woody could have originated from
mm5 it could have originated from mm4. However, by iterating this thought, Woody
could have originated from mm0. Formally: (1′) p6
(2′) p6 → ♦p5




(7′) ♦p1 → ♦p0
(8′) ♦p0
Call this paradox theModal Sorites. The striking feature of this argument is that it does
not involve any modal rules of inference or applications of modal axiom schemata. As
in the case of an ordinary non-modal sorites, the conclusion (8′) is derived from the
premise via repeated application of modus ponens. Indeed, (2′) is the merely unneces-
sitated instance of Tolerance concerning Woody. Moreover, the other premises are
instances of the soritical principle that if it is metaphysically possible for a mate-
rial object to originate from certain matter, then it is metaphysically possible for that
material object to originate from slightly different matter.
Although the Modal Sorites and Chisholm’s Paradox are based on the same prin-
ciples and case, superficially they might appear quite dissimilar. After all, the Modal
Sorites is based on very typical soritical reasoning, whereas the necessitated version
of Tolerance behind Chisholm’s Paradox may not appear at all soritical in nature.
4 Salmon (1986, p. 87) was aware of this paradox; it was discussed by Forbes (1984, pp. 172–173) and later
by Williamson (1990, chap. 8). As discussed below, Salmon thought that this paradox differed importantly
from Chisholm’s Paradox. Note also that Williamson focuses on a version of the paradox that is formulated
in terms of identities between mere possibilia.
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Naturally, this has lead to a discussion in the literature of whether they are one and
the ‘same’ paradox. For example, Forbes (1984, pp. 172–173) stresses the similarity
of Chisholm’s Paradox with the Modal Sorites, and recommends a treatment of the
former which follows that of the latter. Salmon (1986, p. 89; his emphasis), however,
explicitly argues that Chisholm’s Paradox “comes out differently in a very important
respect from a standard sorites argument”, and emphasises that Chisholm’s Paradox
is a “paradox of modality”, presumably in contrast to the Modal Sorites, a paradox of
vagueness. In later work, Salmon (1993) repeats this point in response to Williamson
(1990, p. 127), who observes the similarity of theModal Sorites to Chisholm’s Paradox
and suggests that it would be insufficiently general toweaken the logic ofmetaphysical
necessity in order to handle the latter exclusively.
Clearly, this is a contested issue. Moreover, the debate will not be advanced by
trading instinct-based judgements about what is at the ‘heart’ of each paradox, or
what they are genuinely ‘about’. What is required is an agreed upon working sufficient
condition for treating the paradoxes uniformly. And, indeed, one naturally suggests
itself: logical equivalence. As will be shown, each premise (m) (for 1 ≤ m ≤ 8) of
Chisholm’s Paradox is logically equivalent to premise (m′) of the Modal Sorites in
logics which contain K45, the least normal modal system with all instances of K, 4,
and the following schema as axioms:
5 ♦φ → ♦φ
In this sense, Chisholm’s Paradox and the Modal Sorites may be said to be logically
equivalent in logics which contain K45.
Moral of Equivalence Chisholm’s Paradox and the Modal Sorites are logically
equivalent in logics which contain K45.
To show that Chisholm’s Paradox and theModal Sorites are logically equivalent in the
above sense, the only non-trivial equivalences that require establishing are between
(3)–(7) and (3′)–(7′) all ofwhich have the following respective forms (for 1 ≤ n < 6):5
(m) (pn → ♦pn−1)
(m′) ♦pn → ♦pn−1
Yet Proof 1 in the appendix establishes that (m) implies (m′) in K4, the least normal
modal system which extends system K with all instances of 4. Moreover, Proof 2 in
the appendix establishes that (m′) implies (m) in K5, the least normal modal system
which extends system K with all instances of 5. Thus, given a logic for metaphysical
necessity which includes K45, one must treat the paradoxes uniformly.
It is worth stressing the importance of this observation to certain discussions of
Chisholm’s Paradox. In particular, some authors have argued that ‘soriticality’ is
inessential to Chisholm’s Paradox since there are versions of the paradox which do
not involve minuscule variations in the possible origins of a given object, but instead
5 Forbes (1984, p. 172) notes the following equivalences hold in S5, and others such as Bassford (2019) and
Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri (MS) incorporate the moral of equivalence into their discussions of Chisholm’s
Paradox. Salmon (1986, p. 87) claims that these equivalences hold in S4, but below it will be shown that
there are S4 models in which the equivalences fail.
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larger scale variations in its origins. For example, Sarah-Jane Leslie (2011, pp. 282–
283) presents the case of an axe made from three macroscopic parts, a handle, a blade,
and a shaft. Leslie then considers a version of Chisholm’s Paradox, the major premise
of which is that necessarily if the axe originates from a certain handle, blade, and
shaft, then it is possible that the axe originates from exactly two but not all three of the
handle, blade, and shaft.6 However, the moral of equivalence demonstrates that this
‘large scale’ version of Chisholm’s Paradox will be equivalent in logics containing
K45 to arguments involving no nested modal claims, and whose validity is guaranteed
merely by modus ponens. Thus, even though the non-nested equivalent may not have
the form of a standard sorites series (since it does not appeal to minuscule variations in
the axe’s origins), this does not negate the fact that in K45 one cannot blame iterated
modalities for generating the ‘large-scale’ version of Chisholm’s Paradox. Moreover,
if one were attracted to a vagueness-based solution to these modal paradoxes, it would
not be unreasonable to believe that it is indeterminate whether the major premise of
the ‘large-scale’ version of Chisholm’s Paradox is true, just as it would not be unrea-
sonable to believe that it is indeterminate whether certain ‘large-scale’ removals of
hair result in a person becoming bald.
Interestingly, one can also show that (m) and (m′) are not equivalent when the
logic of necessity does not include K45.7 This highlights that those who take the
logic of metaphysical necessity not to include K45 lose some warrant for treating the
paradoxes uniformly, since the two paradoxes are no longer logically equivalent in the
sense above. Put contrapositively, if one wishes to equate the paradoxes on the basis
of their logical equivalence then one’s modal logic must include all instances of 4 and
5. To demonstrate the technical claim, it suffices to establish the following fact.
(EQ-45) Let KEQ be the normal modal system which extends K with the fol-
lowing axiom: EQ (♦p → ♦q) ↔ (p → ♦q). KEQ includes all instances
of 4 and 5.
Proof 3 in the appendix establishes (EQ-45). Thus, in modal systems weaker than
K45, (m) and (m′) simply cease to be logically equivalent. Of course, this would not
force one into treating the paradoxes non-uniformly in such settings, since logical
equivalence was not necessary for a uniform treatment of the paradoxes. However,
it does suggest that motivation for a uniform treatment of the paradoxes in settings
weaker than K45 is somewhat lacking.
The non-equivalence of (m) and (m′) in systems weaker than K45 can be brought
out vividly by certain non-K45models. Since it will be helpful to have a model theory
in which to situate the discussion in the following sections, we shall define a class
of Kripke models for L. To this end, let a frame F be a pair 〈W,R〉, where W is
a non-empty set (‘the worlds’), and R is a binary relation on W (‘accessibility’). A
model M of L based on F = 〈W,R〉 is a triple 〈W ,R,V〉 where V is a total function
from pairs of the form 〈φ,w〉, for some proposition letter φ and w ∈ W , to either 0
(falsity) or 1 (truth). We define ‘(M, w) |
 φ’ for M = 〈W,R,V〉, w ∈ W , and φ a
6 See also Chandler (1976, p. 107).
7 Thanks to Peter Fritz for helpful discussion here.
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formula of the language, recursively as follows (where ‘A’ is an atomic formula, and
φ and ψ formulae of L):
(M, w) |
 A iff V(A, w) = 1;
(M, w) |
 ¬φ iff (M, w) |
 φ;
(M, w) |
 φ → ψ iff either (M, w) |
 φ or (M, w) |
 ψ ;
(M, w) |
 φ iff (M, u) |
 φ, for all u ∈ W such that wRu.
For an L modelM = 〈W,R,V〉, a formula φ of L is true at w ∈ W iff (M, w) |
 φ.
A formula φ of L is true in an L model M = 〈W,R,V〉 iff it is true at all w ∈ W . A
formula φ of L is valid iff it is true in every Lmodel. A set  of L formulas entails an
L formula φ iff for every L model M = 〈W,R,V〉 and every w ∈ W , if (M, w) |

γ for every γ ∈ , then (M, w) |
 φ. We shall say that an argument with premises 
and conclusion φ is valid when  entails φ.
With this formal apparatus, one can see that the following S4 model M4 =
〈W4,R4,V4〉 shows that (m′) does not even imply (m) in S4:
W4 = N
R4 = {〈w, u〉 : w = 6 or w = u}
V4(pn, w) = 1 iff w = n ≤ 6
This model can be represented in diagram form. In these diagrams, ‘worlds’ are rep-
resented as labelled circles with the name of the ‘world’ occurring outside the circle.
Inside the circle are the proposition letters which are ‘true’ at that ‘world’ in the given
model. Moreover, ‘accessibility’ amongst ‘worlds’ is represented by arrows, although
some instances of ‘accessibility’ will be left implicit for presentational reasons. For
example, if ‘accessibility’ is reflexive, arrows from circles to themselves are omitted;






As can be checked, M4, 6 |
 ♦pn → ♦pn−1 for positive n. However, M4, 6 |

(pn → ♦pn−1), for positive n < 6. At this point, it is pertinent to emphasise
that Salmon (1986, p. 87) claims that the paradoxes are equivalent in S4.8 However,
although (m) implies (m′) in systems which include K4, the above is an S4 model in
which the converse fails. This is significant because, contra Salmon’s suggestion, it
demonstrates that there is no analogue of the moral of equivalence merely with respect
to S4.
8 Salmon (1986, p. 87) writes that “[e]ach of the necessitated conditional premises of the argument (CP)
[Chisholm’s Paradox] is equivalent in S4 to an unnecessitated material conditional”.
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Similarly, we can specify a TmodelMT = 〈WT,RT,VT〉 to establish that (m) does
not imply (m′) in T (in this model, the function |.| takes an integer to its absolute
value):
WT = N
RT = {〈w, u〉 : |w − u| = 1}
VT(pn, w) = 1 iff w = n ≤ 6















In this model, it can be checked that MT, 5 |
 (p4 → ♦p3) despite MT, 5 |

♦p4 → ♦p3. Moreover, it is worth emphasising that MT is a B model too, since RT
is symmetric and reflexive overWT, which highlights the importance of the 4 schema
to securing the implication of (m′) by (m).
These technical facts vindicate the above claim that weakening the logic of meta-
physical necessity in the appropriate way renders (m′) and (m) non-equivalent. More
specifically, even in S4 (m′) and (m) are not equivalent.
2 Relativisedmetaphysical necessity
In a series of recent articles, Benj Hellie, Adam Murray, and Jessica Wilson (2012;
forthcoming) have developed a view of metaphysical necessity according to which it
exhibits a type of relativity.9 According to their view,what ismetaphysically necessary
is relative towhichworld is considered as ‘indicatively actual’. This view of relativised
metaphysical modality, hereafter RMM, promises interesting solutions to a variety of
modal puzzles and paradoxes such as Chisholm’s Paradox, Fine’s (2005) arguments
against Modal Monism, and arguments for the necessity of existence. One of the most
attractive features of these solutions is their advertised capacity tomaintain an S5 logic
formetaphysical necessity.Moreover, asMurray andWilson (2012, pp. 190–198) note,
an advantage of RMM is that it is ‘formally analogous’ (2012, pp. 190–198) to the
epistemic interpretation of the two-dimensional semantic framework,which provides a
natural class ofmodels that are ‘heuristically useful’ (2012, pp. 190–191; forthcoming,
p. 2) for studying RMM. Nevertheless, despite the promise of RMM, the purpose of
this section is to argue that the moral of equivalence creates significant awkwardness
for RMM’s solution to Chisholm’s Paradox. To this end, this section will present the
details of RMM in the context of a two-dimensional modal logic. The strategywill first
be to outline the epistemic interpretation of the two-dimensional semantic framework
and then clarify the formal analogy between it and RMM.
According to Chalmers’ version of two-dimensionalism, with every expression of
a language—not just each predicate letter—is associated a two-dimensional intension.
One can think of a two-dimensional intension as complex semantic value from which
9 See Murray and Wilson (2012) and Murray and Wilson (forthcoming).
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two subsidiary intensions can be recovered, a primary intension and a secondary
intension. In the simple case of monadic predicates, primary intensions are functions
from metaphysically possible worlds considered as actual to sets of individuals, and
secondary intensions are functions from metaphysically possible worlds considered
as counterfactual to sets of individuals.10 Consider some world w1 where the clear,
transparent, drinkable liquid which runs from taps, makes up roughly 55% of the
humanbody, etc., has the chemical compositionXYZ.The primary intension of ‘water’
takes w1 to XYZ. But the secondary intension we actually assign ‘water’ takes w1 to
H2O. Roughly speaking, the thought is that when we consider a world as actual, we
consider what the expression ‘water’ would pick out at that world had its usage been
the same as it actually is. When we consider a world as counterfactual, we consider
what water (i.e. H2O) would have been like at that world.
Clearly, two-dimensionalism and the twin-earth thought experiments used to moti-
vate semantic externalism are closely connected. The lesson of semantic externalism
is that there are aspects of an expression’s meaning which in some sense depend on
how the non-linguistic world turns out. If the clear, transparent, drinkable liquid which
runs from taps, makes up roughly 55% of the human body, etc., has the chemical com-
position XYZ, then ‘water’ refers to XYZ; if the clear, transparent, drinkable liquid
which runs from taps, makes up roughly 55% of the human body, etc., has the chemical
composition H2O, as it actually does, then ‘water’ refers to H2O. Two-dimensionalism
incorporates the fact that the semantic values of expressions like ‘water’ exhibit non-
trivial dependence on the non-linguistic world into its semantic theory by assigning
them a primary intension whose extension varies with which world is considered as
actual.
An upshot to the two-dimensional picture is that truth-value assignments to sen-
tences governed by metaphysical modal operators will be sensitive to which world is
considered as actual. For instance, considering the actualworld as actual it ismetaphys-
ically necessary that water is H2O. But considering w1 as actual, it is metaphysically
impossible that water is H2O, for under that supposition necessarily it is XYZ. It can
help to see a tabular representation of the two-dimensional intension the epistemic
two-dimensionalist assigns to a given expression. Take the sentence ‘water is H2O’.
In the following table, the labels of rows correspond to which world is considered
as actual, and the labels of the columns correspond to which world is considered as
counterfactual:
‘Water is H2O’ H2O world XYZ world
H2O world T T
XYZ world F F
The diagonal of Ts and Fs reaching from the top left T to the bottom right F corresponds
to the sentence’s primary intension—hence its aptronym ‘the diagonal intension’.
10 This description of the two-dimensional framework makes the assumption of modal monism, the thesis
that there is a single modal space over which both primary and secondary intensions are defined. Although
this thesis couples elegantly with aspects of the two-dimensionalist program, it is dispensable; see Chalmers
(2002).
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The rows correspond to the secondary intension that the sentence is assigned when
the H2O-world and XYZ-world are respectively considered as actual, which clearly
represent two different functions. Thus an expression’s secondary intension alongwith
its extension varies with which world is considered as actual, hence why metaphysical
necessities are sensitive to which world we consider as actual.
Murray andWilson (2012) offer a ‘metaphysical’ interpretation of the Chalmersian
framework, whilst retaining the “formal analogy” (p. 198) to it. To be specific, Murray
& Wilson depart from epistemic two-dimensionalism in their interpretation of sec-
ondary intensions. The traditional line is to treat all secondary intensions, except the
one assigned when the actual world is considered as actual, as mere epistemic neces-
sities for all we know a priori. However, Murray and Wilson (2012, p. 211) regard
them as genuine ‘relativised’ metaphysical necessities. Hellie, Murray and Wilson
(forthcoming, p. 15; their emphasis) later describe this view as follows.
Our intended picture ismoderate modal naturalism: facts about natural law (and,
in turn, about metaphysical possibility) have a hybrid explanation: some such
facts are underdetermined either by any abstract metaphysical principles alone,
or by any actual contingent ‘categorical’ facts alone, but instead only become
determined through the concretization of certain true such principles in actual
categorical facts.
Nevertheless, whatever departure Murray and Wilson make from epistemic two-
dimensionalism, they still endorse (2012, p. 203) the claim that not all truths vary
with which worlds are considered as actual, since there must be some ‘basic’ ways of
individuating or specifying worlds which are invariant as such. Indeed, like Chalmers,
they (2012, p. 202) hold that “the basic individuation of worlds [...] might proceed
by way of, e.g., ‘semantically stable’ (Bealer 2000) or ‘canonical’ (Chalmers 2006)
descriptions.” Effectively, this guarantees that Murray and Wilson’s ‘metaphysical’
interpretation of the Chalmersian framework does not depart foundationally from
Chalmers’ preferred epistemic construal. At points in the following discussion, this
will become pertinent.11,12
A central moral that Murray and Wilson want to draw from Chisholm’s Paradox is
that truth-value assignments to essentialist claims aboutWoody’s material makeup are
highly sensitive to which world is considered as actual. As one way of predicting this
sensitivity, they (2012, p. 206) entertain a view on which proper names like ‘Woody’
function similarly to natural kind terms. On this implementation of RMM, just as the
denotation of ‘water’ varies with which world is considered as actual, so does the
11 Murray andWilson offer two ways of developing their proposal, an ‘overlapping’ worlds approach and a
‘non-overlapping’ worlds approach. The following discussion takes place within the former. However, it is
important to note that on either approach Murray and Wilson recognise the need for a way of individuating
worlds in ‘basic’ terms. For the overlapping worlds approach, this is required to characterise the pre-
relativised space of worlds; see Murray and Wilson (2012, pp. 202–203). For the non-overlapping worlds
approach, it is required to identify ‘basic’ or ‘canonical’ counterparts of worlds in different relativised
spaces; see Murray and Wilson (2012, p. 207, n. 12).
12 The analogy with epistemic two-dimensional semantics plays a less central role in Hellie, Murray and
Wilson’s (forthcoming) presentation of RMM. However, their appeal to the ‘actual categorical facts’ of a
world (Sect. 4.2.1) suggests that something close to the ‘basic individuation’ of worlds by ‘semantically
stable’ or ‘canonical’ descriptions still plays a key role in RMM.
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denotation of ‘Woody’. As a consequence, the various denotations of ‘Woody’ differ
in their modal profiles, specifically regarding thematter fromwhich they can originate.
Advocates of RMM suggest that acknowledging this sensitivity dissolves Chisholm’s
Paradox.
To provide more detail, regarding Chisholm’s Paradox Murray and Wilson would
claim that when we consider world 6 as actual it is necessary that amongst all six of
Woody’s original parts are, say, at least three of those which it has at 6. However,
when we consider world 4 as actual it is not necessary that amongst all six of Woody’s
original parts are at least three of those which it has at 6, for whenworld 4 is considered
as actual ‘Woody’ changes its denotation. Thus, when world 4 is considered as actual,
it is necessary that amongst all six of Woody’s parts are at least three of those it has at
4 (and so one of those which it has at 6).
To clarify this proposal, it helps to provide a simple model of Chisholm’s Paradox
within the RMM framework.13 To do so, the previously used propositional languageL
is extended toL↓ with the modal operator ↓, which will be used in the object-language
to express which world is considered as actual. An RMM-frame F = 〈W,R〉 is an L
frame in which R is an equivalence relation. An RMM-model M of L↓ based on an
RMM-frame F = 〈W ,R〉 is a triple 〈W ,R,V〉 in which V is now a total function from
triples of the form 〈φ,w, u〉, for some proposition letter φ and w, u ∈ W , to either 0
(falsity) or 1 (truth). The idea will be that truth at 〈w, u〉 corresponds to truth at world
u when w is considered as indicatively actual. We thus define ‘(M, w, u) |
 φ’ for
M = 〈W,R,V〉, w, u ∈ W , and φ a formula of the language, recursively as follows
(where ‘A’ is an atomic formula, and φ and ψ formulae of Lp):
(M, w, u) |
 A iff V(A, w, u) = 1;
(M, w, u) |
 ¬φ iff (M, w, u) |
 φ;
(M, w, u) |
 φ → ψ iff either (M, w, u) |
 φ or (M, w, u) |
 ψ ;
(M, w, u) |
 φ iff (M, w, u′) |
 φ, for all u′ ∈ W such that uRu′;
(M, w, u) |
 ↓φ iff (M, u, u) |
 φ.
For an RMM-modelM = 〈W,R,V〉, a formula φ of L is true at 〈w, u〉 for w, u ∈ W
iff (M, w, u) |
 φ. A formula φ of L is true in an RMM-model M = 〈W,R,V〉 iff it
is true at 〈w, u〉 for all w, u ∈ W .14 A formula φ of L is RMM-valid iff it is true in
every L model.
At this point, it is worth highlighting that officially Murray and Wilson (2012,
pp. 190–191, n. 1) note that their proposal “does not involve any additional [modal]
operators” such as↓, which is typically present in two-dimensional logics.15 However,
Murray andWilson (2012, p. 197) offer a specification of Salmon’s argument in terms
13 I follow the formal implementation provided by Murray and Wilson (2012). Hellie, Murray and Wilson
(forthcoming, p. 14, n. 14) mention that another ‘counterpart-theoretic’ implementation could be applied to
Chisholm’s Paradox too,which differs in variousways fromLewis’s (1986) and Forbes’s (1984) applications
of counterpart-theoretic resources to Chisholm’s Paradox.
14 There are alternative definitions of ‘true in an RMM-model’ which generate different notions of validity,
such as the definition of ‘true in an RMM-model M = 〈W,R,V〉’ as truth at 〈w,w〉 for all w ∈ W . The
choice between these different notions of validity will not be significant in what follows.
15 For instance, see the systems of two-dimensional modal logic in Davies and Humberstone (1979).
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of subscripted possibility operators in order to clarify their diagnosis of it. The ↓
operator is used here as a mere alternative to such subscripted operators.
Consider a particular RMM-modelM2 = 〈W2,R2,V2〉 of L↓, defined as follows.
W2 = {n ∈ N : n ≤ 6}
R2 =W2 × W2
V2(pn, w, m) =
{
1, if m = n ∧ |w − n| ≤ 3
0, otherwise
This model can also be represented in diagram form. As before, ‘worlds’ are repre-
sented as labelled circles with the name of the ‘world’ occurring outside the circle,
and proposition letters which are ‘true’ at that ‘world’ in the given model occurring
inside the circle. Each row corresponds intuitively to ‘metaphysical modal space’
when a certain ‘world’ (the marked node) is considered as ‘indicatively actual’. Since























Put informally, in this RMM-model when world 6 is considered as indicatively actual,
Woody must originate from at least half of the matter it does at 6. Yet considering
world 4 as indicatively actual, Woody can originate from just less than half of the
matter it does at 6. One can see this formally by noticing the following facts about the
model:
V2(pn, n, n) = 1, for all n ∈ W
V2(p2, 6, n) = 0, for all n ∈ W
V2(p2, 4, 2) = 1
As a result (M2, 6, 6) |
 ♦p2, yet (M2, 4, 6) |
 ♦p2. However, despite this,M2 does
not serve as a countermodel to any instance of axiom schema 4. For all instances of
♦♦φ → ♦φ are true in M2 given the definition of R2. Indeed, all the axioms of S5
are true inM2, since S5 is sound over the class of RMM-frames. Indeed, Murray and
Wilson (2012, p. 204; p. 208) view the retention of S5 as a central advantage of the
RMM solution, particularly over Nathan Salmon’s (1986, 1989) anti-S4 proposal.
Of course, it follows that advocates of RMM view Chisholm’s Paradox, i.e. the
above formal line of reasoning in L, as an RMM-valid argument. Thus, advocates
of RMM will reject one of its premises. Yet they will not reject premise (1), since
it is a fact about Woody’s actual origins. Moreover, they will not reject premise (2)
since in their terms it merely amounts to the claim that (considering the actual world
as indicatively actual) Woody could have originated from slightly different matter,
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which their approach is designed to recognise. Thus they must reject at least one of
premises (3)–(7). To be more precise, say that advocates of RMM accept (reject) a
claim exactly when that claim is true (false) when the actual world is considered as
indicatively actual. Since in the above model world 6 models the actual world, advo-
cates of RMM will reject premise (5), the formula (p3 → ♦p2). Read informally,
(5) is the claim that it is metaphysically necessary that if Woody originates from
six parts, m1, m2, m3, n4, n5, n6 then it is metaphysically possible that Woody origi-
nates from six parts, m1, m2, n3, n4, n5, n6 (recall that p6 is understood informally as
the claim that Woody originates from six parts, m1, . . . , m6). However, advocates of
RMM would be keen to stress that (5) is true when world 4 is considered as indica-
tively actual. Hence Murray and Wilson (2012, p. 198–199; my emphasis) diagnose
the fallacy of Chisholm’s Paradox to be that accepting its premises involves “iterated
or in situ shifts in which world is held fixed as indicatively actual” that “illegitimately
shift indicatively actual horses in modal mid-stream”.
Murray andWilson (2012, p. 197) specify a version of Salmon’s argument in terms
of subscripted possibility operators in order to clarify how iterated shifts in which
world is held fixed as indicatively actual figure in the reasoning. As mentioned before,
the ↓ operator is used here as a mere alternative to such subscripted operators. In terms
of this alternative, Murray and Wilson would accept all of the following claims:
(RMM1) ¬♦p2
(RMM2) (p3 → ↓♦p2)
(RMM3) ♦↓♦p2
Indeed, in the above model one can easily verify that (RMM1)–(RMM3) are all true at
〈6, u〉 for any u ∈ W . Thus although the advocate of RMMwill reject(p3 → ♦p2),
theywill accept (RMM2)which involves the iterated shift inwhichworld is considered
as indicatively actual
Nevertheless, despite this novel diagnosis of Chisholm’s Paradox, the moral of
equivalence creates significant awkwardness for the proposed RMM solution. As
emphasised in Sect. 1, the moral of equivalence is that Chisholm’s Paradox and the
Modal Sorites are logically equivalent in logics which contain K45. Since S5 is one
such logic, this generates the consequence that the advocate of RMM must recognise
that (3)–(7) are equivalent with (3′)–(7′) respectively. But in the context of RMM, this
consequence is bizarre. The crucial point is that the Modal Sorites involved no nested
modal claims, so it is extremely difficult to seewhy it would result from ‘iterated shifts’
in which world is considered as indicatively actual. Indeed, as stressed previously, the
distinctive feature of the Modal Sorites is that it can be run solely from the perspective
of the actual world since its premises are all claimed to be actually true. However,
since the advocate of RMMwill reject one of (3)–(7) from Chisholm’s Paradox, given
S5 they must also reject one of (3′)–(7′) from the Modal Sorites. But there is no scope
to ameliorate the denial of one of (3′)–(7′) by merely prefixing its consequent with an
occurrence of ↓, as the advocate of RMM attempted to with (RMM2) in response to
their denial of (5). To appreciate this, notice that both of the following two formulas
would be rejected by advocates of RMM in the above model:
(5′) ♦p3 → ♦p2
(5′↓) ♦p3 → ↓♦p2
123
Synthese (2021) 198:9873–9896 9887
Thus one cannot ameliorate the denial of (5′) by blaming its allure on an iterated shift
in perspective.
The concern can be stated more generally by appeal to the so-called reduction
theorem of S5. Say that a formula of L↓ is nested iff it belongs to L and contains
an occurrence of  which occurs within the scope of some other occurrence of .
Similarly, say that a formula of L↓ is non-nested iff it belongs to L and contains
no occurrence of  within the scope of some other occurrence of . According to
these definitions,p and(p → ¬¬q) are nested formulas,p and (¬¬p →
p) are non-nested formulas, and any formula which contains any occurrences of
↓ is neither nested nor non-nested. The S5 reduction theorem may then be stated as
follows.16
S5 Reduction Theorem Any nested L↓ formula is S5 equivalent to a non-nested
L↓ formula.
According to theS5ReductionTheorem, nestedmodal claims are alwaysS5 equivalent
to non-nested claims. Thus, S5 is simply not hospitable to blaming modal paradox
on ‘iterated shifts’ of perspective induced by nested modal claims. In doing so, the
advocate of RMM rejects a nested claim. However, given the S5 Reduction Theorem,
that nested claim is S5 equivalent to a non-nested claim, which the advocate of RMM
must therefore reject. But they cannot explain their rejection of the non-nested claim
by appeal to ‘iterated shifts’ of perspective induced by nested modal claims.
Supplementing this, it does not seem persuasive to ameliorate the denial of (5′)
by merely citing its S5 equivalence to (5), even if we grant that (5)’s denial can be
ameliorated by blaming its allure on an iterated shift in perspective. First, there is
the point that one should not expect hyperintensional features like allurement to be
closed under logical implication (or known logical implication). For example, one
might be allured to the axioms of ZFC on the grounds of set-theoretic platonism, yet
not be so allured to the Banach-Tarski theorem despite knowing the axioms to imply
it. Moreover, in addition, the manoeuvre does not appear to constitute a satisfactory
amelioration of one’s rejection of (5′) anyway. To offer an analogy in point, consider
two different formulations of an ordinary non-modal sorites paradox. As its major
premises, the first employs a collection of ‘no sharp boundary’ theses of the form
¬(pn ∧ ¬pn+1). In contrast, as its major premises the second employs collection of
‘inductive’ conditionals of the form pn → pn+1. Now, consider an advocate of a
solution to the sorites paradox who refuses to accept one of the ‘no sharp boundary’
theses but explains its allure in terms of a very specific cognitivemechanism pertaining
to embeddings of negations in the context of vagueness.Regardless of the explanation’s
idioscyncracy, surely even this character should recognise that either they ought to
reject classical logic orfind someotherway to ameliorate their rejectionof the inductive
conditional which is classically equivalent to the negated conjunction in question.
16 See Hughes and Cresswell (1996, pp. 97–100) for a proof of a more precisely stated version of this
theorem, which they also dub the ‘S5 Reduction Theorem’. The theorem is proven by identifying an
effective procedure which, for any L formula, specifies a non-nested formula that is S5 equivalent to it.
The theorem is used to show that S5 has a modal conjunctive normal form theorem, which weaker modal
logics typically lack.
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In summary, the retention of S5 creates significant awkwardness for RMM’s diag-
nosis of whyChisholm’s Paradox is fallacious. LikeNathan Salmon’s anti-S4 solution,
the RMM diagnosis places great emphasis on the occurrence of nested necessity oper-
ators. Yet blaming modal paradox on ‘iterated shifts’ of perspective induced by nested
necessity operators is difficult to reconcile with the characteristic feature of S5 that
possibility is simply a non-contingent matter. This casts doubt onwhether RMMoffers
a satisfactory solution to Chisholm’s Paradox.
3 Themoral of revenge
Adequate solutions to paradoxesmust have the capacity to handle ‘revenge’ variants of
the paradox. Infamously, crude non-bivalent solutions to the Liar Paradox suffer from
revenge paradoxes in the form of ‘strengthened liar’ sentences.17 Similarly, proposed
solutions to Chisholm’s Paradox must have the capacity to handle revenge variants of
it, if they are susceptible them.
The exact formulation of revenge Chisholm paradoxes will of course depend on the
proposed solution to the initial paradox. However, in recent work Andrew Bacon
(2018, pp. 280–281) has formalised a quantified version of the Modal Sorites in
which all the non-modal terms involved in the argument are precise. Since there is
a close similarity—indeed an S5 equivalence—between Chisholm’s Paradox and the
Modal Sorites, Bacon’s non-modally preciseModal Sorites can be adapted to construct
revenge Chisholm’s Paradoxes. In particular, it can be adapted to generate a revenge
paradox for the RMM treatment of Chisholm’s Paradox.
To appreciate this point, recall the connection between semantic externalism and
two-dimensionalism. As was previously emphasised, expressions susceptible to twin-
earth style thought experiments—twin-earthable expressions—are assigned primary
intensions which assign different secondary intensions to the expression at different
worlds considered as actual. But not all expressions are twin-earthable. As Chalmers
(2012, p. 374) himself recognises,many expressions are non-twin-earthable, or seman-
tically neutral, in that their primary intension assigns the expression the same secondary
intension across all worlds considered as actual.18 Such expressions include items of
purely logical vocabulary like quantifiers and the truth-functional connectives, the
predicates which feature in developed mathematical theories, foundational physics,
and phenomenal terms like ‘consciousness’. Indeed, as Chalmers (2012, pp. 233–
243) emphasises, that there are such semantically neutral expressions is crucial to
one’s being in principle capable of articulating a semantically neutral description of
the world—something which is integral to the two-dimensionalist program. More-
over, as highlighted previously, Murray and Wilson appeal to this feature of the
two-dimensionalist program in their development of RMM. Consequently, if there
are variants of Chisholm’s Paradox formulated solely in terms of semantically neutral
expressions, the RMM proposal lacks the resources to handle them, for the modal sta-
17 See Beall (2011) for a collection of essays on revenge liar paradoxes.
18 Chalmers (2012, pp. 370–375) suggests that non-twin-earthability is only an approximation of semantic
neutrality, but, as will become clear, nothing crucial to the following argument depends on this point.
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tus of semantically neutral sentences is not sensitive to which world is considered as
indicatively actual. But by adapting Bacon’s non-modally preciseModal Sorites, there
are variants of exactly this kind. The strategy will be to purge all non-semantically
neutral expressions such as proper names from the paradox and replace them with
semantically neutral expressions such as logical vocabulary. Likewise, we shall ensure
that there are only semantically neutral predicates in the statement of the paradox.
Given that it is key to the two-dimensionalist (and RMM) program that worlds can
be described in semantically neutral terms, there is always guaranteed to be such a
paradox which makes use of only semantically neutral predicates.
To present such a variant, a quantified modal language is required. Thus let L+
contain countably many individual variables (x, y, . . .), countably many plural vari-
ables (xx, yy, . . .), the two-place logical predicates = (identity) and ≺ (is one of),
the non-logical predicates  (originates from) and < (is an original proper part of), ¬
(negation) and→ (thematerial conditional) as the only truth-functional connectives, ∀
(universal quantification), and (necessity), all of which are semantically neutral. The
predicates and≺ take individual variables in their first argument and plural variables
in their second argument; the predicates and= and< take individual variables in both
arguments. Although not formally required by the argument, informally one might
want to think of the formula (x, xx) as being true (under a given assignment) only
when (what is assigned to) the xx do not merely comprise only (what is assigned to)
x . One could formalise this claimwith the formula(x, xx) → ∃y(y ≺ xx ∧ y = x),
but, to reiterate, that assumption is not strictly required.
We also define numerical quantifiers ∃n read as ‘there are at least n’ (for n > 0) in
the usual way:
∃n xφ =d f ∃x1 . . . ∃xn( ∧
1≤i = j≤n
xi = x j ∧ ∧
1≤i≤n
φ[xi/x])
where φ[xi/x] is the result of substituting all free occurrences of x in φ for xi , and
x1–xn are the first n variables not to occur free in φ given some fixed ordering.
As metalinguistic abbreviations, we introduce an identity-like predicate ≡ which
takes plural variables in both its arguments and an existence predicate E which applies
to plural variables as follows:
xx ≡ yy =d f ∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ x ≺ yy)
Exx =d f ∃yy(yy ≡ xx)
As is standard, the backgroundmodal plural logic requires that plural variables behave
rigidly with respect to ≺, in the sense that if this thing is (not) one of those things,
then necessarily that thing is (not) one of those things, provided those things exist.19
(Rgd+) x ≺ xx → (Exx → x ≺ xx)
(Rig2−) ¬x ≺ xx → (Exx → ¬x ≺ xx)
19 See Williamson (2013, chap. 6) and Linnebo (2016) for motivation for (Rgd+) and (Rgd−), whose
formalisations are given by Linnebo (2016, p. 644).
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As Linnebo (2016, p. 645) highlights, in the presence of standard background assump-
tions (Rgd+) and (Rgd−) imply the necessity of the co-extensionality of plurals:
(NC) ∀xx∀yy(xx ≡ yy →  xx ≡ yy)
Less formally, (NC) states that when these things are exactly those things, they are
necessarily as such. In this setting, it is also natural to assume that necessarily an
individual’s original proper parts are exactly those things which it originates from:
(<) ∀xx∀x((x, xx) → ∀y(y < x ↔ y ≺ xx))
However, this assumption is neither required by nor used in the following argument.
A semantically neutral variant of the paradox may now be stated in L+. For sim-
plicity, let us reconsider a simplified version of the Woody case in which, as before,
actually Woody originates from six parts, however there is only one complex object
(Woody) and nothing else besides its six original proper parts.20 This added simplic-
ity will merely reduce the complexity in what follows, and is not key to the broader
point about being able to construct revenge Chisholm Paradoxes. In this semantically
neutral version of the paradox, informally the first premise states that actually there is
only one complex object and nothing else besides its original proper parts. Formally,
this can be stated as the premise that there are some things from which some other
thing originates, and this is the only case of some thing originating from some things:
(R1) ∃xx∃x((x, xx) ∧ ∀yy∀y((y, yy) → y = x ∧ yy ≡ xx))
Premise (R1) will be abbreviated by the formula ∃!xx∃!x(x, xx), and I shall use a
similar convention in the case of other formulas.
An instance of Tolerance then states that if some thing originates from some things,
it is possible that that thing exists but one of those things is not one of its original proper
parts.
(R2) ∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → ♦(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃1y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)))
The remaining premises can be viewed as instances of necessitated Tolerance. For
instance, the third premise formalises the claim that if some thing originates from
some things, then necessarily if that thing exists but one of those things is not one of
its original proper parts, then it is possible that the thing exists but two of those things
are not amongst its original proper parts.
(R3)
∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → [(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃1y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)) → ♦(∃z(z =
x) ∧ ∃2y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x))])
20 One could drop the assumption that there is only one complex object and nothing else besides its original
proper parts by just imposing restrictions on the quantifiers in the following claims, provided the restrictions
were stated in semantically neutral terms. For example, one could identify each of the proper original parts
by a semantically neutral description of its entire spacetime region and restrict the plural quantifiers to such
things accordingly.
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Again as before, there are a number of similar premises terminating in the premise
that if some thing originates from some things, then necessarily if that thing exists and
five of those things are not amongst its original proper parts, then it is possible that





∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → [(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃5y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)) → ♦(∃z(z =
x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x))])
In standard plurally quantified modal systems which contain S4, one can then derive
the claim that the only thing which originates from some things is such that it could
exist whilst originating from totally different matter.
(R8) ∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → ♦(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)))
More precisely, in the appendix it is shown that premises (R1)–(R7) entail (R8) over a
standard class ofmodels for a typical quantifiedmodal plural logic. But fromKripke’s
Thesis and the assumption that there is only one complex object and nothing else
besides its six original proper parts, the following claim may be inferred:
(R9) ∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → ¬♦(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)))
Yet plainly (R9) contradicts (R8).
This is merely a quantified variant of Chisholm’s Paradox. The two-dimensional
approach, however, does not have the capacity to handle this particular argument, for
it is formulated entirely in terms of semantically neutral vocabulary. Specifically, log-
ical expressions like quantifiers do not exhibit the same variability in extension across
worlds considered as actual as proper names like ‘Woody’ do. Since all variations of a
paradox ought to be afforded the same treatment, the RMM solution lacks the required
scope.
One can anticipate the complaint that  (originates from) and < (is an original
proper part of) are not semantically neutral, perhaps due to it being contested that
they are susceptible to twin-earth style thought experiments. However, regardless of
whether they are, remember that it is key to the two-dimensionalist (and RMM) pro-
gram that entire worlds can be described in semantically neutral terms. This includes
their facts about mereology and origins. Accordingly, there must be some semantically
neutral conditions in terms of which - and <-facts can be redescribed. A variant of
the above argument could then be run in which those neutral conditions are uniformly
substituted for  and < in the appropriate manner. Indeed, given RMM’s reliance
on basic semantically neutral descriptions of worlds, there will always be revenge
versions of Chisholm Paradox that they are unable to handle. More generally, the
following moral may be drawn.
Moral of Revenge Some proposed solutions to Chisholm’s Paradox are suscep-
tible to revenge versions of the paradox.
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4 Concluding remarks
As stated in the beginning, Chisholm’s Paradox provides important constraints on our
modal theorising. However, as the morals of equivalence and revenge demonstrate,
one should be cautious about treating Chisholm’s Paradox in isolation, as a single line
of reasoning. There are subtle variations on the canonical form of the paradox whose
treatment must be incorporated into a holistic solution. Just as Chisholm’s Paradox
provides important constraints on our modal theorising, these two morals provide
crucial constraints on the space of solutions to the paradox.
OpenAccess This article is licensedunder aCreativeCommonsAttribution 4.0 InternationalLicense,which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence,
and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If
material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted
by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the
copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Appendix
Definition 1 The language L is defined using: countably many proposition letters
(p, p1, ...); material implication (→) and negation (¬) as the only truth-functional
connectives, and the unary modal operator  (metaphysical necessity).
The well-formed formulas of L are given by the following rule (where α is a propo-
sitional variable):
φ := α | ¬ψ | (ψ → χ) | ψ
We write  as an abbreviation for the string (p → p) and ♦ as an abbreviation for
the string ¬¬. We introduce ∧,∨, and ↔ by the usual abbreviations.
Definition 2 K is the axiomatic system forLwith the following axioms and following
rules of proof. (Where  is a set of L formulas and φ is an L formula,  K φ
abbreviates the claim that there is a finite sequence of formulas each of which is either
one of the axioms, a member of , or follows from earlier items in the sequence by
applying one of the rules of proof. K φ abbreviates ∅ K φ.)
PL All tautologies of propositional logic.
K (p → q) → (p → q)
MP If  K φ and  K φ → ψ , then  K ψ
US If K φ then K ψ , where ψ results from uniformly substituting proposition
letters in φ by arbitrary formulas
Nec If K φ then K φ
The formula (p → q) → (♦p → ♦q) is labelled K♦; note that K K♦.
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Definition 3 Consider the following formulas of L.
4 ♦♦p → ♦p
5 ♦p → ♦p
EQ (♦p → ♦q) ↔ (p → ♦q)
When S is an axiomatic system and φ is an L formula, Sφ is the axiomatic system
which extends S by the addition of φ as an axiom. In what follows, we consider the
following axiomatic systems:K4,K5,K45, andKEQ.When S is an axiomatic system,
S should be understood in the same manner as K with the obvious changes.
Theorem 1 (m) K4 (m′)
i. (pn → ♦pn−1) (m)
ii. ♦pn → ♦♦pn−1 K♦, MP, (i)
iii. ♦♦pn−1 → ♦pn−1 4
iv. ♦pn → ♦pn−1 PL, (ii), (iii)
Theorem 2 (m′) K5 (m)
i. ♦pn−1 → (pn → ♦pn−1) PL
ii. ♦pn−1 → (pn → ♦pn−1) K, Nec, MP, (i)
iii. ♦pn−1 → ♦pn−1 5
iv. ♦pn → ♦pn−1 (m′)
v. ♦pn → (pn → ♦pn−1) PL, (iv), (iii), (ii)
vi. ¬♦pn → ¬pn DF♦
vii. ¬pn → (pn → ♦pn−1) PL, K, Nec, MP
viii ¬♦pn → (pn → ♦pn−1) PL, (vi), (vii)
ix. (pn → ♦pn−1) PL, (v), (viii)
In this proof, note that Nec is not applied to the non-theorem premise (m′) or anything
which is shown to follow from (m′).
Theorem 3 KEQ 5
i. (♦ → ♦q) → ( → ♦q) EQ (LTR)
ii. ( → ♦q) → ( → ♦q) K
iii. (♦ → ♦q) → ( → ♦q) PL, (i), (ii)
iv. ♦q → (♦ → ♦q) PL
v. ♦q → ( → ♦q) PL, (iii), (iv)
vi.  → (( → ♦q) → ♦q) PL
vii. ( → ♦q) → ♦q PL, Nec, MP, (vi)
viii. ♦q → ♦q PL, (v), (vii)
Theorem 4 KEQ 4
i. (♦q → ♦q) → (♦♦q → ♦q) EQ (RTL)
ii. (♦q → ♦q) PL, Nec
iii. ♦♦q → ♦q MP, (i), (ii)
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Definition 4 The language L+ is defined using: countably many individual variables
(x, y, . . .); countably many plural variables (xx, yy, . . .); material implication (→)
and negation (¬) as the only truth-functional connectives; the unary modal operator
 (metaphysical necessity); the two-place non-logical predicates < (is an original
proper part of) and  (originates from); the logical predicates = (identity) and ≺ (is
one of), and, finally, ∀ (universal quantification) left ambiguous between both plural
and individual quantification.
The well-formed formulas of L+ are given by the following rule (where v and v′ are
individual variables and vv is a plural variable):
φ := v = v | (v, vv) | v ≺ vv | v < v′ | ∀vφ | ∀vvφ | ¬ψ | (ψ → χ) | ψ
We use the same abbreviations as before and write ∃ for the string ¬∀¬.
Definition 5 A model of L+ is a triple M = 〈W,D,D,V〉. In these models, W is a
non-empty set, D is a non-empty set, D is a total function from elements w ∈ W to
subsets D(w) of D. Moreover, V is a total function from pairs 〈	,w〉 of non-logical
predicates 	 and elements w ∈ W such that:
V〈,w〉 ⊆ D(w) × P(D(w))
V〈<,w〉 ⊆ D(w) × D(w)
A variable assignment g over an L+ model M is total function from individual vari-
ables to elements of D and plural variables to subsets of D. We write g(d/v) for
the variable assignment just like g except that it assigns d to the individual variable
v; similarly, we write g(S/vv) for the variable assignment just like g except that it
assigns S to the plural variable vv.
Definition 6 ‘(M, w) |
g φ’ (‘true at w on g’) is defined recursively in the following
manner, where φ is a well-formed formula of L+, M = 〈W,D,D,V〉, and w ∈ W .
In this definition, v and v′ are individual variables, vv is a plural variable, and φ and
ψ are both well-formed formulas of L+.
(M, w) |
g (v, vv) iff 〈g(v), g(vv)〉 ∈ V〈,w〉
(M, w) |
g v < v′ iff 〈g(v), g(v′)〉 ∈ V〈<,w〉
(M, w) |
g v = v′ iff g(v) = g(v′) ∈ D(w)
(M, w) |
g v ≺ vv iff g(v) ∈ g(vv) ⊆ D(w)
(M, w) |
g ¬φ iff (M, w) |
g φ
(M, w) |
g φ → ψ iff (M, w) |
g φ or (M, w) |
g ψ
(M, w) |
g φ iff (M, u) |
g φ, for all u ∈ W
(M, w) |
g ∀vφ iff (M, w) |
g(d/v) φ, for all d ∈ D(w)
(M, w) |
g ∀vvφ iff (M, w) |
g(S/vv) φ, for all S ⊆ D(w)
For an L+ model M = 〈W,D,D,V〉, a formula φ of L+ is true at w ∈ W iff
(M, w) |
g φ for all variable assignments g. A formula φ of L+ is L+ valid in a
model M = 〈W,D,D,V〉 iff φ is true at all w ∈ W; φ is valid iff it is valid in all
models. A set  of L+ formulas L+ entails an L+ formula φ iff for any L+ model
M = 〈W,D,D,V〉, any w ∈ W , and any variable assignment g, if every γ ∈  is
true at w on g then so is φ.
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Remark The semantics validates a standard ‘contingentist’ S5 plurally quantified
modal logic including (Rgd+), (Rgd−), and (NC).
Theorem 5 (R1)–(R7) L+ entail (R8).
Proof Consider an arbitrary L+ modelM = 〈W,D,D,V〉, arbitrary w ∈ W , and an
arbitrary variable assignment g. If (R1) is true at w on g then there is some variable
assignment g′ different from g at most in what it assigns to x and xx such that
{〈g′(x), g′(xx)〉} = V〈,w〉. Since (R2) is true at w on g, there is some u ∈ W such
that g′(x) ∈ D(u) and there is at least one d ∈ g′(xx) such that 〈d, g′(x)〉 /∈ V〈<
, u〉. By similar reasoning and the fact that (R3)-(R7) are all true at w on g, there is
some u′ ∈ W such that g′(x) ∈ D(u′) and there are least six d ∈ g′(xx) such that
〈d, g′(x)〉 /∈ V〈<, u′〉. Thus, (M, u′) |
g′ ∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x).
Hence, (M, w) |
g′ (x, xx) → ♦(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺ xx ∧ ¬y < x)). Given
how g′ was introduced, (M, w) |
g ∃!xx∃!x((x, xx) → ♦(∃z(z = x) ∧ ∃6y(y ≺
xx ∧ ¬y < x))). In other words, (R8) is true at w on g, which completes the proof. 
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